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ABSTRACT
Why do scientists withhold information from colleagues, violating the professional norm of sharing?
Norm violations are usually attributed to individual interests that lead scientists to reject professional
norms. In contrast, we take the view that norm violations can occur when professional norms are valued
but it is difficult to ascertain the appropriate course of professional conduct. This view suggests that
scientists may look to cues from their professional reference groups to resolve sociological ambivalence
arising from conflicting role expectations. We analyze a dataset of 1,251 geneticists and other life
scientists from 100 U.S. universities and find that beyond individual-level explanations, information
withholding is influenced by the behaviors of peers as well as the attitudes of superiors in the profession.
We discuss the implications for the professions literature, theories of organizational learning, and
knowledge management initiatives in firms.
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Organizational scholars have established that information withholding – the intentional failure to
share potentially useful information with others – can impede intra-organizational learning processes that
are critical for successful firm performance (see Argote and Ophir 2002 for a review). For example,
information withholding within an organization can hinder that organization’s ability to transfer best
practices, learn from mistakes, stimulate innovation, or benefit from strategic alliances (e.g., Brown and
Duguid 1991, Edmondson 1996, Szulanski 1996, Larsson et al. 1998, Reagans and McEvily 2003).
Information withholding beyond the organization’s borders can also reduce its potential for innovation,
growth, and effectiveness, however, by impeding the advancement of knowledge about spheres of activity
that are critical to its work. In particular, information withholding among academic scientists is widely
believed to obstruct the advancement of scientific knowledge by preventing them from challenging,
verifying, and building on each others’ research (Polanyi 1962, Bok 1982, Nelkin 1984). Since scientific
knowledge is vital to the success of firms in numerous industries, including high technology,
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and energy (e.g., Bierly and Chakrabarti 1996, Liebeskind et
al. 1996, Almeida and Kogut 1999, Cohen et al. 2000, Murray 2004, Owen-Smith and Powell 2004), it is
important to understand why information withholding occurs in science.1
Prior theory and research has offered two contrasting perspectives on this question. In Merton’s
seminal paper on the normative structure of science, he argued that the academic science profession is
characterized by a fundamental macro-level norm of communalism, or “communism,” that obliges
scientists to place their research in the public domain through full and open sharing with the scientific
community as early as possible in the discovery process (Merton 1973 [1942]). Yet this ideal of openness
is often breached, as attested by gossip about withholding incidents that circulates among scientists,
reports in the popular press, and growing concern about whether commercialization encourages secrecy
(e.g., Argyres and Liebeskind 1998, Cook-Deegan and MacCormack 2001, Louis et al. 2001, Walsh and
Hong 2003, Murray and Stern 2007). Emphasizing a fundamental norm of communalism without
addressing the exercise of agency by individual scientists who choose to withhold thus presents an oversocialized account of professional conduct (cf. Granovetter 1985). In contrast, a series of papers published
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in the leading medical journals has responded to the concern about increasing incentives for secrecy
among academic scientists by examining micro-level predictors of withholding behavior (e.g.,
Blumenthal et al. 1997, Campbell et al. 2002, Blumenthal et al. 2006). By focusing on individual
activities and attributes, such as engagement in commercial activities (e.g., Campbell et al. 2002), these
studies imply that scientists’ decisions to withhold or share information are determined by their individual
interests. This perspective provides useful insight into who withholds, but its account of withholding
behavior is under-socialized in that it largely overlooks the influence of the social context in which
scientists operate (cf. Granovetter 1985).
To steer a middle course between the over-socialized and under-socialized accounts of
information withholding, we offer a meso perspective that proposes that academic scientists look to
reference groups within the profession to guide their professional conduct, not simply either to a
fundamental norm of communalism or to their own individual interests. Following the sociological
literature on professions, we view norms as morally regulated role expectations for members of the
profession (Goode 1957, Wilensky 1964, Merton 1973 [1942], Freidson 2001). However, we depart from
the traditional characterization of professional norms by suggesting that their influence operates at the
level of reference groups embedded within the profession rather than more broadly across the profession.
We argue that scientists look to professional reference groups to guide their behavior because their
professional role expectations are often conflicting rather than clear. These conflicting role expectations
create “sociological ambivalence”―uncertainty about the appropriate course of professional
conduct―that makes it difficult to weigh a fundamental norm of communalism against individual
interests (Merton and Barber 1963, Merton 1976).
We define professional reference groups as subsets of individuals within the profession who
serve as potential sources of social influence for their members as well as non-members (cf. Merton 1968,
Hyman and Singer 1968). Consistent with prior research that uses externally observable criteria such as
organizational roles or social categories to establish reference group membership (e.g., Goodman 1974,
Singh 1994, Terry et al. 1999), we identify reference group members as those who share common
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professional characteristics that differentiate them from non-members, such as the same specialty or rank.
In contrast to an emic (participant-defined) approach, which relies on scientists to identify the members of
their reference groups by name, this etic (observer-defined) approach can capture broad social influences
that are not necessarily based on established relationships (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1982, Lawrence 2006). We
develop hypotheses concerning the influence of professional reference groups on information withholding
by scientists and examine boundary conditions for this influence that arise from the characteristics of the
group members, their behaviors and attitudes, and the focal scientists themselves. Building on the prior
research on withholding among scientists, we focus on the life sciences community, particularly
geneticists. We use interview data to briefly illustrate the conflicting role expectations that these scientists
face and how reference groups influence them, and then test our hypotheses using quantitative survey data
from a national study of 1,251 life scientists at 100 leading U.S. research universities.

INFORMATION WITHHOLDING AMONG LIFE SCIENTISTS
Macro and Micro Perspectives
Academic scientists regularly receive requests for information related to their research, where
information refers to research-related findings, methods, data, or materials (McCain 1991, Hilgartner and
Brandt-Rauf 1994). For example, scientists are often asked to share their research protocols, data sets, and
biomaterials such as cell lines or antibodies. Even when the research results are already published in
journals or technical reports, these formats frequently omit critical information that cannot be published,
such as clones, algorithms, software, or detailed descriptions of techniques. Some journals state formal
policies about an author’s responsibilities related to sharing publication-related data and materials, but
their scope is typically limited to making this information available to editors and reviewers if they ask
for it, and about half of the 56 most cited life science and medical journals have no such policy at all
(National Research Council 2003). Thus, scientists who want to replicate or extend the results of
published studies frequently approach the authors of these studies directly to request additional sharing.
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The importance of information sharing for the progress of science provides the functional
imperative for the professional norm of communalism. In Merton’s early formulation of this norm, he
stated, “Secrecy is the antithesis of this norm; full and open communication its enactment” (Merton 1973
[1942]: 274). This suggests that information withholding is a violation of a uniformly revered norm of
sharing, a socially unacceptable and morally unjustifiable act. Sociological theories of professions have
argued that such strong norms are inculcated through rigorous professional socialization, using methods
such as formal training and apprenticeships, and then reinforced by rewards of recognition and the threat
of social sanctions (Merton et al. 1957, Hagstrom 1965, Freidson 2001). Despite this characterization of
professions as governed by deeply entrenched macro-level norms, however, individual members of
professions often engage in behavior that violates these norms (Pavalko 1988, Leicht and Fennell 2001).
Although a macro perspective does not directly explain why individuals sometimes withhold
information, the implication is that such norm violations occur when poorly socialized scientists reject the
fundamental norm of communalism in favor of their individual interests. Whereas a strong collective
identity encourages group members to uphold a norm of generalized exchange (Flynn 2005), social
loafing and free-riding behaviors are more common when group members feel lower levels of
identification with the group (Kidwell and Bennett 1993). Similarly, when professional socialization is
insufficient or ineffective, scientists whose individual interests favor withholding may reject the
fundamental norm of communalism because they see the personal advantages of withholding as more
important to them than the rewards and sanctions of the profession that mandate sharing.
This explanation for withholding behavior provides the rationale for research that focuses on
individual-level predictors of information withholding (e.g., Campbell et al. 2002, Blumenthal et al. 2006).
Prior studies from this micro perspective have shown that scientists are more likely to withhold
information not only if they are more involved in commercial activities or receive more industry support,
but also if they receive more requests, conduct research on human subjects, or are male (Campbell et al.
2002). Similarly, the tension between a norm of communalism and individual interests suggests that
scientists will withhold more if others have denied their requests in the past, if their academic mentors
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were less willing to share their own information with other scientists, or if they perceive competition for
recognition or scientific priority in their area to be more intense (cf. Walsh et al. 2007).
A Meso Perspective
Both the macro and micro perspectives on information withholding assume that professional
norms provide clear role expectations that individuals choose to follow or reject by weighing the costs
and benefits of violating them. However, professionals often face conflicting rather than clear role
expectations, as Merton himself recognized in his later writings (Merton and Barber 1963, Merton 1976).
Merton’s original conceptualization of the normative structure of science has long dominated
characterizations of the scientific profession, as well as critiques that argue that this conceptualization
views actors as unduly constrained (e.g., Mulkay 1969, Knorr-Cetina 1999, Sismondo 2004). But Merton
later departed from his initial view to propose that science is “patterned in terms of potentially conflicting
pairs of norms,” rather than governed by fundamental norms that serve as clear guides to professional
conduct (Merton 1976: 33). For example, scientists’ roles demand originality, encouraging them to strive
to be first to announce a significant discovery, but also humility, discouraging them from fighting for
priority if multiple investigators announce a discovery simultaneously (Merton 1963).
Merton argued that such juxtapositions of dominant norms and counter-norms create
“sociological ambivalence” in the form of “inner conflict among scientists who have internalized both of
them” (Merton 1976: 36).2 Despite Merton’s modifications of his early views on scientific norms, the
ideas of conflicting norms and sociological ambivalence have been largely neglected (for exceptions, see
Mitroff 1974, Mills 1983, Etzkowitz 1989). In particular, neither Merton nor the few scholars who have
built on these ideas have addressed the implications for communalism specifically or explained how
scientists resolve sociological ambivalence. We address these gaps by arguing that scientists are aware of
counter-normative expectations of information withholding that conflict with the dominant normative
expectations of information sharing, and that this creates sociological ambivalence for them. It is possible
that scientists who face such contradictory role expectations may simply decide to act according to their
individual interests, as prior research suggests. But we propose that rather than rejecting professional
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norms entirely, scientists often attempt to resolve the resulting ambivalence in a professionally acceptable
way by looking to their reference groups within the profession for cues to guide their behavior. Below, we
develop hypotheses about how the withholding behaviors and attitudes of reference group members
influence a scientist’s propensity to withhold information, and we also address the influence of other
reference group characteristics on information withholding.
Influence of Reference Group Withholding Cues
Professional reference groups can exert influence over individuals who do not belong to the group
themselves or even interact with the group members (Merton 1968, Singer 1981). This distinguishes them
conceptually from other potential sources of influence such as social networks, institutional affiliations, or
work groups. As well as exerting direct influence through interpersonal exchanges with the members,
professional reference groups can also exert indirect forms of influence on scientists, including cognitive
influence through shared experiences (Strang and Meyer 1993), relational influence through others’
awareness of them (Lawrence 2006), and motivational influence through non-members’ aspirations to
join the group in the future (Merton 1968).
Members of the scientific profession can have multiple reference groups. The life sciences
community, for example, encompasses a number of professional fields, including genetics, biochemistry,
microbiology, and pathology, among others. Other life scientists in the same field constitute a potential
reference group for a life scientist. Within the field of genetics, which is the main focus of our study,
scientists have a professional specialty based on the model organism on which they work, such as
bacteria, yeast, or humans. For a geneticist specializing in bacteria, other geneticists specializing in
bacteria constitute a potential reference group of more similar colleagues. Within each specialty, further
subgroups of still more similar colleagues can be identified on the basis of professional status, which
refers here to a position in the hierarchy of the profession that carries social significance (Abbott 1981).
Professional status characteristics are achieved rather than ascribed (i.e., earned through abilities and
effort) and often serve as a social cue that individuals use to evaluate others’ competence or expertise
(Berger et al. 1980). For example, an important professional status characteristic in the academic life
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sciences community is a scientist’s academic rank (cf. Campbell et al. 2002, Blumenthal et al. 2006,
Owen-Smith 2001). We view scientists of the same professional status as the focal scientist (e.g., the
same rank) as potential reference groups of status-equals, and those of higher professional status than the
focal scientist (e.g., higher rank) as potential reference groups of status-superiors.
The conduct of reference group members serves as a cue for scientists faced with conflicting role
expectations by influencing the visibility and acceptability of withholding behavior. If withholding
behavior by reference group members is not visible, scientists are likely to conclude that it is not a viable
option for them; in contrast, visible withholding behavior by others can encourage emulation (cf.
Bamberger and Biron 2007, Marsden and Friedkin 1993). If withholding behavior appears socially
unacceptable, it would seem to threaten the rewards that the reference group can provide and increase the
risk of sanctions. For example, colleagues might reject a funding application, recommend against a
promotion, or spread gossip that is reputationally damaging for a scientist who engages in unacceptable
behavior (cf. Burt and Knez 1996).
Higher levels of information withholding among the members of a scientist’s reference groups
increase the likelihood that a focal scientist will also engage in withholding behavior. When levels of
withholding in reference groups are higher, the visibility of such behavior increases because the scientist
is more likely to personally experience, observe, or hear about a withholding incident (cf. Merton 1968).
The scientist also runs a lower risk of having his or her own withholding behavior noticed when others
engage in similar behavior, since any particular withholding incident is less worthy of attention. Higher
levels of withholding in reference groups also increase the acceptability of withholding behavior because
the scientist’s own withholding behavior becomes more legitimate to the extent that more group members
engage in it (cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Further, if other scientists have withheld information
themselves, they are likely to be less critical of a scientist who withholds. Hence:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1). Information withholding by reference group members will have a positive
influence on withholding by a scientist.
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Information withholding in reference groups composed of scientists who are more professionally
similar to a focal scientist in their field, specialty, and status can be expected to be more influential for that
scientist because homophily—preference for similar others—is a strong basis for influence in social
contexts (e.g., Festinger 1954, Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954, Ibarra 1992). Since social cues are more
salient when they come from more similar others, withholding behavior by more similar others attracts
more attention from the focal scientist, heightening its visibility. Similarly, withholding among more
similar others is more important for legitimizing the scientist’s own withholding behavior. Even for
scientists who do not care whether their behavior is acceptable to their colleagues, the behaviors of others
who are more professionally similar to them may still matter more than those of less similar others because
they serve as signals about the competitive landscape: if professionally similar colleagues frequently
withhold information, scientists might decide that sharing information would put them at a disadvantage.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2). Information withholding by reference group members will have a more positive
influence on withholding by a scientist if the group members are more professionally similar to the scientist.
If withholding by reference group members serves as a cue that guides the behaviors of scientists,
the influence of this cue can be expected to be greater when the cue is less ambiguous. The influence of
withholding behavior by reference group members thus will be stronger when this behavior is more
crystallized, where crystallization refers to the extent of agreement among group members about the level
of the behavior in which an individual can appropriately engage (Jackson 1965). A high level of
withholding in the group serves as a stronger cue encouraging withholding if more members of the group
withhold at or around the same level because there appears to be greater agreement that withholding is
acceptable. In contrast, a high level of withholding by group members serves as a weaker cue if some
members withhold frequently but others withhold rarely because it is less clear that withholding is
generally acceptable among the group members. By increasing the ambiguity surrounding the
acceptability of withholding, greater variance reduces the effects of withholding by reference group
members on a scientist’s conduct.
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HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3). Information withholding by reference group members will have a less positive
influence on withholding by a scientist if the group members vary more in their levels of withholding.
Finally, scientists can look to reference groups of status-superiors as well as reference groups of
status-equals for normative guidance (Merton 1968, Singer 1981). “Anticipatory socialization,” expressed
in conduct appropriate for members of a higher-status group, may increase their chances of joining that
group and ease their adjustment once they join (Merton and Rossi 1950: 58). However, the injunctive
norms of a group, which refer to what members believe ought to be done, often differ from its descriptive
norms, which refer to what the members actually do (Cialdini et al. 1990)—and aspiring group members
recognize that status-superiors usually expect them to “do as we say, not as we do” (Siegel and Siegel
1971). It may also be easier to find out about the withholding attitudes of status-superiors than their
withholding behaviors, as they are more likely to volunteer information about the former than the latter
when asked. Consequently, the attitudes of reference group members who are superior in status to a focal
scientist may guide that scientist’s withholding decisions more than their behaviors. In contrast, the
behaviors of reference group members who are equal in status to a focal scientist are more visible than
their attitudes, and more likely to affect that scientist’s withholding decisions by capturing attention,
causing offense, generating gossip, or triggering competitive responses.
HYPOTHESIS 4a (H4a). The withholding behaviors of reference group members will have more influence
than their attitudes on withholding by a scientist if they are the scientist’s status-equals.

HYPOTHESIS 4b (H4b). The withholding attitudes of reference group members will have more influence
than their behaviors on withholding by a scientist if they are the scientist’s status-superiors.

Influence of Other Reference Group Characteristics
Our hypotheses focus on the influence of reference groups’ withholding cues on information
withholding by a focal scientist. However, other reference group characteristics may generate alternative
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explanations for withholding. First, some groups may be more engaged in commercial activities than
others, encouraging withholding by group members as well as the focal scientist. For example, some
specialties may offer greater opportunities and rewards for commercial activities, or senior faculty may be
more engaged in commercial activities than junior faculty. Second, some groups may be more
competitive than others, creating perceptions of higher competitiveness that motivate increased
withholding by both the group members and the focal scientist. Third, the members of some groups may
receive more requests than others due to the nature of their work, again increasing the tendency of both
group members and the focal scientist to withhold. Fourth, the members of smaller groups may be more
able to detect antisocial behavior and enforce sanctions, discouraging withholding by both group
members and the focal scientist. Fifth, specialties may differ in specific characteristics that affect
withholding behavior. For instance, the rate of scientific discoveries may be faster in some specialties
than in others, creating pressure that motivates both the group members and the focal scientist to withhold
information in an effort to maintain a strategic advantage in the race to publication. We examine all these
additional group-level explanations in our analyses, as well as the individual-level explanations noted
earlier, to establish whether the predicted influence of reference group withholding cues holds after taking
them into account.

METHODS
We tested the hypotheses using quantitative data obtained from a survey of 3,000 geneticists and
other life scientists conducted between March and July 2000 by the Center for Survey Research at the
University of Massachusetts in Boston. Two focus group discussions, 20 semi-structured interviews, and
pretests in nine one-on-one meetings informed the design of the survey. Additionally, we conducted
informational interviews with 18 academic scientists, identified through snowball sampling, to develop
more in-depth insights into the life sciences community and the professional role expectations of its
members. The interviewees included geneticists as well as other life scientists from 12 departments at 5
institutions, who ranged in age from their late-20s to mid-60s and held tenured or non-tenured
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appointments. The interviews lasted one to two hours, and some included laboratory tours and on-site
observations. Before describing the quantitative data and analyses, we draw on these informational
interviews to offer some qualitative insights into the conflicting role expectations experienced by life
scientists and how professional reference groups influence information withholding in this community.

Qualitative Insights
Conflicting role expectations. The scientists we interviewed reported varying views on
information withholding, a term with which they were familiar and that they often invoked proactively.
At one end of the spectrum, reflecting the macro view that information sharing is mandated by a
fundamental professional norm of communalism, one scientist stated:
I just believe that it’s my duty as a scientist to help advance scientific knowledge by sharing what
I’ve learned with others if it can help them, even if there’s no personal advantage to me. I think
most people feel the same. But, of course, there are always some who don’t seem to have had that
sense of responsibility so deeply burned into them.
At the other end of the spectrum, consistent with the micro view that information withholding is driven by
individual interests, another scientist observed:
Scientific research is so competitive, it’s a dog-eat-dog world. Sometimes you have to look out
for yourself. No one else will.
More commonly, however, the interviewees reported that decisions about whether to share or withhold
information in response to a request from another scientist were often complicated because others’
expectations of them as members of the scientific profession created pressures to withhold that conflicted
with the dominant norm of sharing.
In particular, they reported feeling that information withholding was necessary to enable them to
fulfill the fundamental professional expectation of innovative scholarship (Hagstrom 1965, Sutton 1984).
Sharing valuable information with others could compromise their ability to meet this core requirement of
their professional role by endangering their research autonomy, inhibiting their freedom to choose what to
study, how to study it, and when to publish the findings. As one scientist put it:
My job is to generate and publish original research findings. If I give away data or materials, even
from a paper I’ve already published, I’m going to have more trouble doing my job successfully.
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Another explained why this was a concern:
How likely people are to want to share these things is partly connected to where they are in trying
to carry out that work.… There might be future studies there, especially with respect to materials.
You might be required by journals to reference particular samples or sequences that you put in the
paper. But if someone asks for your whole collection, that’s a different matter.
And another scientist echoed a similar theme:
People withhold when they feel like they have a gold mine of information that they might like to
use for a long time.… They’ll withhold data for a long time because they’re waiting to get the very
best story and the most credit. They don’t want to feel like they’re a sucker for having given away
all their data. They want to be able to say, “This is my contribution,” and get it recognized.
Further, the interviewees indicated that withholding was viewed as a morally regulated role
expectation not only because such behavior was reinforced by the promise of professional rewards, but
also because violations created risks of sanctions for betraying other members of the profession. Most
notably, scientists frequently pointed to an obligation to protect doctoral or postdoctoral students. Sharing
information that could compromise the ability of students to publish their work was widely viewed as a
violation of a professional responsibility toward dependents. As one scientist commented:
People often explain [withholding] by saying “my graduate student needs to get full credit.” I
think that’s partly an acceptable excuse, but it’s also a real reason. There are big investments in
collecting data…. More senior people have less riding on a particular data set, but if they give the
game away too soon, their students’ work could be wrecked.
Withholding was also sometimes viewed as an obligation toward superiors in the profession, not just
students. Violation of this expectation could incur the wrath of colleagues, as a junior researcher noted:
In my former lab, I worked on a technology that has the potential to be widely used. The lab had
already spent three or four years on it before I got there. It was almost deadlocked. When I got there, I
developed a small trick, small but very crucial, that got the project moving again.... It was my turn to
present at a joint group meeting with five or six other labs. The PI [principal investigator] was afraid
I’d maybe say something I shouldn’t [about details of the technology that might enable others to
replicate it]. He asked to review the slides. He said, “Don’t talk too much about this—don’t give too
much detail.” At the meeting, of course, people wanted to ask me questions. A senior person asked
something I thought was completely appropriate for me to answer. But my PI got very angry, even at
the meeting. Afterwards he told me to come to his office. We almost fought over this.
These examples illustrate that the academic scientists we interviewed often viewed their
professional roles as accompanied by potentially conflicting expectations of information sharing and
withholding. Sometimes the decision was obvious, but sometimes it was not. As one scientist succinctly
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observed, “It’s often a judgment call.” Another articulated the ambivalence that many expressed as
follows:
Often, when I get a request, I struggle with whether to just ship out what the person asks for or tell
them, “Look, I want to help, but I can’t give you this just yet. If you get back to me in a few months,
hopefully things will look different.” I really want to be a good colleague, but there are good reasons
to hold back sometimes. On the other hand, I know it’s frustrating to be on the other end when
someone won’t let you have something you need. I’ve spent some sleepless nights over this.
How reference group withholding cues influence scientists. For scientists who face such
conflicting role expectations, an important requirement for reference group influence is that there are
opportunities to learn about the withholding behaviors and attitudes of reference group members. Our
interviews indicated that life scientists have many such opportunities because collegial interaction is very
high in this professional community. The scientists we interviewed typically participated in frequent
professional conferences, consortia, and retreats, estimating that on average they attended four to ten
gatherings per year of varying sizes, excluding advisory and peer review committees, study sections at the
National Institutes of Health, and other meetings. The laboratory-based research system also generates
extensive networks of contacts, as scientists usually run labs in which instructors, post-docs, graduate
students, and undergraduates work alongside technicians and administrative staff. The training and
socialization process they undergo in the labs generate contacts, and departures to set up new labs leave
the former labs with ever-expanding networks of one-time members. Scientists also build and maintain
contacts through the extensive collaborations that are typical in the life sciences. Articles are rarely soleauthored, and lists of co-authors can be long; for example, one associate professor who described himself
as moderately productive estimated that he had worked with about 10 primary collaborators and more
than 30 co-authors during 15 years of publishing. The result of these wide-ranging connections and
communication opportunities is that the social environment of the life sciences community provides
fertile conditions for reference group influence.
Our interviewees also offered examples of how this influence operates. For instance, indicating
that scientists tend to withhold more when their reference groups make this behavior more visible and
acceptable, one scientist told us, “I think people feel like it’s okay to withhold sometimes when they think
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that everyone else does it too.” Another observed, “When I’m not sure what’s appropriate to do in a
particular situation, I usually try to think about what other people who face the same sort of pressures as
me would do,” suggesting that reference group members who were more professionally similar to him
were those to whom he would naturally look for guidance. The role of variance in withholding behaviors
in reference groups was also apparent, as one scientist commented, “If everyone you know does it
[withholds] sometimes, it’s probably okay to say no occasionally, but if it’s just that one cranky guy that
everyone talks about who says no to even the most minor things, you probably don’t want to be like him.”
Finally, the influence of status-superiors’ attitudes was evident, as illustrated by this quote: “It’s
important to me to see what people I admire think.” The qualitative insights obtained through our
interviews thus provide some initial evidence to support the hypotheses that we now test systematically in
our quantitative analyses.

Quantitative Data Collection
The quantitative data used in this study focused primarily on academic geneticists but also
covered other academic life scientists (see Campbell et al. 2002). To collect data from a comprehensive
sample of geneticists and a random sample of other life scientists at leading U.S. academic institutions,
survey recipients were selected by identifying all departments and programs in genetics and human
genetics in the 100 U.S. universities that received the most funding from the National Institutes of Health
in 1998. Then, up to three additional life science departments and programs at the same universities were
randomly selected from lists of clinical departments (medicine, pathology, psychiatry, pediatrics, and
surgery) and non-clinical departments (biochemistry, microbiology, pharmacology, physiology, and
anatomy) that had received the largest number of NIH grants in 1998. All faculty members in each
selected department and program were identified using the Association of American Medical Colleges
faculty roster system, Peterson’s Graduate Programs in the Biological Sciences, school and individual
Web sites, college bulletins, and direct contact with departments. In addition, all faculty members who
were principal investigators on at least one research grant from the Human Genome Project (HGP) in the
five years preceding the study were identified. The study sample of 3,000 faculty members consisted of
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two strata: faculty members in genetics or human genetics departments (n = 1,766) and faculty members
from clinical and non-clinical departments (n = 1,234). The first stratum included all 219 grantees of the
HGP and all 1,547 faculty members in genetics or human genetics departments. The second stratum was
randomly selected to include 617 faculty members from non-clinical departments and 617 clinical
departments. To avoid including faculty who were not actively engaged in research, the sample excluded
clinical department faculty who had no publications in the MEDLINE database in the three years
preceding the study.
Of the 3,000 potential respondents, 107 were ineligible for the study because they were retired,
out of the country, not located at the sampled institution, not faculty appointments, in the sample twice, or
deceased. Of the remaining subjects, 1,849 responded, yielding an overall response rate of 64%.
Confidentiality concerns prevented identification of the institutions to which the respondents belonged in
the survey, but the research design enabled the identification of non-respondents while ensuring
respondent anonymity by asking the respondents to return a postcard separately from the survey. From the
list of non-respondents, 256 were interviewed briefly by telephone to determine how they differed from
respondents. Non-respondents were less likely to be geneticists, more likely to be full professors, and
more likely to receive a high number of requests for information related to their research. In addition to
examining the effects of these characteristics on information withholding in our models, we examined
whether respondents with and without these characteristics were influenced differently by reference group
behaviors and attitudes, and found that they were not, indicating that the exclusion of non-respondents
was unlikely to have influenced our results.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable was whether a scientist had denied requests for information related to his
or her published research. We focused on denials of post-publication requests to maintain consistency
with prior research on information withholding by life scientists, which has primarily examined
withholding of information related to published research (e.g., Campbell et al. 2002, Walsh et al. 2007).
The survey respondents were asked: “In the last three years, about how many times have you received
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requests from other academic scientists for information, data, or materials concerning your published
research?” Of the 1,849 respondents, 1,388 reported having received at least one request. Those who
reported receiving at least one request were then asked: “In the last three years, how many times have you
denied giving other academic scientists requested information, data, or materials related to your published
research?” We considered respondents who reported that they had denied at least one request to have
engaged in withholding. After restricting the sample to 1,251 respondents who reported having received
at least one request and responded to this question, the dependent variable, information withheld, was
coded 1 if the respondent reported denying at least one request or 0 otherwise.3
Reference Group Withholding Variables
We examined three levels of professional reference groups for the life scientists in our sample
based on field, specialty, and professional status. Although other possible criteria for determining
reference groups exist, we selected these for analysis because (a) according to our interviews, they are
standard professional dimensions along which life scientists commonly categorize themselves and others,
(b) examining these three levels of reference groups enabled us to test the influence of groups of
increasing professional similarity to the focal scientist, and (c) the potential to progress from lower to
higher status positions enabled us to test the influence of reference groups of status-superiors as well as
status-equals.
The first step in constructing the reference group measures was to identify the members of each
focal scientist’s professional reference groups. To establish the focal scientist’s field within the life
sciences, the survey respondents were asked to identify themselves as geneticists (coded 1) or others
(coded 0), where a geneticist was defined as a scientist “whose research involves any of the following: (1)
identification of genomes, genes, or gene products in any organism; (2) study of the structure, function, or
regulation of genes or genomes; or (3) comparison of genes and genomes between species and
populations.” The focal scientist’s field-based reference group included all scientists coded 1 if the focal
scientist was a geneticist or 0 if a non-geneticist.
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To establish the focal scientist’s specialty within the field of genetics, respondents who identified
themselves as geneticists were asked to indicate whether they specialized in working with amphibia,
bacteria, drosophila, fungi, humans, other mammals, nematodes, plants, viruses, yeast, or zebra fish. A
dichotomous variable for each specialty was coded 1 if the geneticist specialized in that organism or 0
otherwise. The focal scientist’s specialty-based reference group included all geneticists coded 1 for the
same specialty.
To capture the focal scientist’s status within his or her specialty in the field of genetics, we
examined four status characteristics that carry social significance in the life sciences community
according to our interviewees as well as prior research (e.g., Campbell et al. 2002, Owen-Smith 2001).
These were academic rank, research experience, research productivity, and research budget. Rank was
coded 0 if the respondent reported that he or she was an instructor or lecturer, 1 if an assistant professor, 2
if an associate professor, or 3 if a full professor. Using this measure, we identified reference groups of
status-equals as including all geneticists in the same specialty of the same rank, and reference groups of
status-superiors as including all geneticists in the same specialty of higher rank. We measured experience
by the number of years that the respondent had spent conducting research in the U.S., productivity by the
number of articles that the respondent had published in refereed journals in the last three years, and
budget by the total fiscal-year research budget in thousands of dollars for all grants, contracts, and
projects from all sources on which the respondent was the principal investigator. To identify reference
group members based on these criteria, we used moving windows set to three years above and below the
focal scientist’s experience, three articles more and less than the focal scientist’s productivity, and
$150,000 above and below the scientist’s budget, respectively. We identified status-equals as including all
geneticists in the same specialty of comparable experience, productivity, or budget (i.e., within the
moving windows set by the focal scientist), and status-superiors as all geneticists in the same specialty
with greater experience, productivity, or budget (i.e., above the moving windows set by the focal
scientist).4
The second step in constructing the reference group withholding variables was to calculate the
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withholding behaviors and attitudes in each group and match them to the focal scientist’s entry in the data
set.5 RG w/h level is the average number of times that the members of each group reported withholding
information from another scientist who requested it (e.g., RG w/h level [same rank] refers to the level of
withholding among reference group members with the same rank as the focal scientist).6 RG w/h variance
is the standard deviation in the number of times that the members of each group reported withholding
information (e.g., RG w/h variance [same rank] refers to the variance in withholding among reference
group members with the same rank as the focal scientist).7 RG w/h attitudes is the average of the
reference group members’ responses to the following statement: “Academic scientists should freely share
information, data, or materials with all academic scientists” (scale of 1 = “completely agree,” 2 =
“somewhat agree,” 3 = “somewhat disagree,” or 4 = “completely disagree”), where a higher score
indicates more favorable attitudes to withholding in the group (e.g., RG w/h attitudes [higher rank] refers
to the attitudes to withholding among reference group members with higher rank than the focal scientist).
Reference Group Control Variables
To address other possible forms of reference group influence beyond their withholding cues, we
included several reference group control variables in our models. RG commercialization is the proportion
of members in each reference group who were engaged in commercial activities. RG competition is the
average level of perceived competition among the members of each reference group. RG requests
received measures the average number of requests received by the members of each reference group. RG
size is captured by the number of members in the reference group. The sizes of the reference groups
varied according to their type—field, specialty, and professional status. The field-based reference groups
consisted of 904 geneticists and 347 non-geneticists. The eleven specialty-based reference groups
included 70.55 scientists on average, ranging from 7 (zebra fish) to 231 (mammals). The average size of
the status-based reference groups was 30.83 (rank), 49.83 (experience), 23.85 (productivity), and 31.70
(budget).8 We also used dichotomous variables for each specialty to control for any other unobserved
differences across specialties that might lead to higher withholding by both members and the focal
scientist, such as variation in discovery rates.9
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Individual Control Variables
To address individual explanations for information withholding in our models, we first included
the individual-level variables that prior research has found to significantly predict withholding: receiving
more requests, engaging in commercial activities, receiving industry support, conducting research using
human subjects, and being male (Campbell et al. 2002). We followed the prior research in coding these as
dichotomous variables.10 Requests received was coded 1 if the respondent received more than six requests
for data, information, or materials regarding his or her publications from other academic scientists during
the last three years or 0 if the respondent received one to six requests. Commercial activities was coded 1
if the respondent answered “yes” to any of the following questions about engagement in commercial
activities or 0 otherwise: “In the last three years has the research that you do at your university resulted in
(a) patents applied for, (b) patents issued, (c) patents licensed, (d) a product under regulatory review, (e) a
product on the market, (f) a start-up company?” Industry support was coded 1 if the respondent had
received research grants or contracts from companies whose work was related to his or her area of
scientific expertise in the last three years or 0 otherwise. Human subjects was coded 1 if the respondent
reported conducting research that involved living humans as research subjects in the last three years or 0
if not. Male was coded 1 if the respondent was male or 0 if female.
Second, we included additional individual-level variables that prior research or our interviews
suggested could motivate information withholding in the life sciences context. Own requests denied
captures whether the respondent had had his or her own requests denied by another academic scientist in
the last three years (1 if one or more requests were denied or 0 otherwise). Mentor withholding captures
the influence of mentors by averaging the responses to two questions: “When you were in (a) predoctoral
(b) postdoctoral training, how willing were your lab directors/mentors to share their research information,
data, or materials with other academic scientists?” (1 = “very,” 2 = “somewhat,” 3 = “not very,” or 4 =
“not at all”). Perceived competition measures how a scientist perceived the overall level of competition in
his or her area using the following question: “How would you characterize the overall level of

20

competition for recognition or scientific priority in your specific area of research?” (1 = “not at all
competitive,” 2 = “not very competitive,” 3 = “moderately competitive,” or 4 = “very competitive”).
Finally, we also examined individual-level variables that corresponded to the professional
characteristics used to construct the reference group withholding variables described above: the focal
scientist’s field, specialty, rank, experience, productivity, and budget. We also included the scientist’s
attitude to withholding as a control variable in the models that examined reference group attitudes.

RESULTS
The 1,849 life scientists who responded to the survey reported receiving a total of 35,601 requests
in the last three years from other academic scientists for information, data, or materials concerning their
published research, an average of 19 requests per scientist. The percentage of scientists in the sample who
reported denying at least one such request was 10.9%, and those who withheld information denied an
average of 9.7% of requests received.11 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the
variables shown in the models. In the subsequent tables, we report the results of logistic analyses
predicting the likelihood that a scientist engaged in information withholding.
----- insert Table 1 about here ----Effects of Control Variables
The models in Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the results for the hypotheses as well as the individual
and reference group control variables. We discuss the control variables first. Model 1 in Table 2 includes
the full sample of 1,251 geneticists and non-geneticists who received at least one request for information.
Replicating prior research on individual-level predictors of withholding (Campbell et al. 2002), this
model shows that these life scientists were more likely to withhold if they received more requests,
engaged in commercial activities, used human subjects in their research, and were male, though industry
support was not associated with withholding in this model or any others. Scientists were also more likely
to withhold if they had had requests of their own denied and mentors who were less willing to share
information, but the effect of perceived competition was not significant. All subsequent models focus on
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the sample of 904 geneticists only. These models show that geneticists were more likely to withhold
information if they engaged in commercial activities, were male, reported higher perceived competition in
their areas, and had more favorable attitudes to withholding. All these models also include the group-level
controls for reference group size, commercialization, competition, and requests received; these are
consistently non-significant.
In additional analyses (not shown), we also addressed whether scientists’ individual specialties,
rank, experience, productivity, or budgets influenced the likelihood of information withholding by
examining the effects of these individual-level variables. The results indicated that compared to those
who specialized in humans, those who specialized in mammals, viruses, or yeast were less likely to
withhold (p < 0.05, p < 0.01, and p < 0.10 respectively). However, excluding the individual specialty
variables from the models did not affect our main results. We detected no significant main effects of
individual rank, experience, productivity, or budget; no curvilinear effects of these four variables; and no
other non-linear effects by using categorical measures instead of continuous measures. We further
examined the effects of interactions between the individual-level variables on withholding behavior (e.g.,
rank and commercial activities), but found no significant results.
----- insert Table 2 about here ----Effects of Levels of Information Withholding in Reference Groups (H1)
H1 predicted that information withholding in a reference group will have a positive influence on
withholding by a focal scientist. Model 1 in Table 2, which includes the full sample of life scientists,
shows that more withholding in reference groups composed of all others in the same field (i.e., geneticists
or non-geneticists) is not significantly associated with a higher probability of withholding by a focal
scientist. However, Model 2, which focuses on the sample of geneticists only, indicates that more
withholding in groups composed of other geneticists with the same specialty does have a significant
positive effect, providing initial evidence to support H1. Models 3-6 examine the effects of withholding in
reference groups composed of geneticists with the same specialty who also shared the same rank,
experience, productivity, or budget as the focal scientist. These models provide further support for H1, as
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there is a significant positive association between the level of withholding in the reference group and a
focal scientist’s withholding behavior for each of the four status-based reference groups.
Effects of Information Withholding in More Professionally Similar Reference Groups (H2)
H2 predicted that the influence of information withholding in a reference group will be stronger if
the group members are more professionally similar to the focal scientist. Comparing Model 2 to Model 1
in Table 2 provides initial evidence to support this hypothesis, as groups composed of geneticists with the
same specialty had a more significant positive effect on withholding by the focal scientist than groups
composed of all geneticists, and the improvement in model fit from including the reference group
withholding variable is correspondingly greater for Model 2 than for Model 1. Comparing Models 3-6 to
Model 2 provides further support for H2, as the effects of groups composed of geneticists with the same
specialty who were also similar in status were more significant than the effects of groups composed of
geneticists with the same specialty of any status, and the improvements in model fit from including the
reference group variables are greater for Models 3-6 than for Model 2. The models thus support H2.
Effects of Variance in Information Withholding in Reference Groups (H3)
Models 1-8 in Table 3 show the results for H3, which predicted that the influence of information
withholding by reference group members will be weaker if the group members vary more in their level of
withholding. To test this hypothesis, we examined interactions between the (mean-centered) level and
variance of withholding in the most professionally similar reference groups (i.e., geneticists with the same
specialty who also shared the same rank, experience, productivity, or budget as the focal scientist). The
models show that for all four types of status-based reference groups, the positive association between
withholding by reference group members and withholding by a focal scientist is lower when there is more
variance around those higher levels of withholding. These results provide support for H3.
----- insert Table 3 about here ----Effects of Behaviors v. Attitudes in Reference Groups of Status-Equals v. Status-Superiors (H4)
H4a predicted that withholding is influenced more by the behaviors than the attitudes of statusequals. As reported earlier, Models 3-6 in Table 2 show significant effects of withholding behaviors in
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reference groups composed of members with the same rank, experience, productivity, and budget as the
focal scientist. In comparable models not shown here, we examined the effects of withholding attitudes in
these reference groups. The results revealed no significant effects of withholding attitudes in groups with
same rank, productivity, or budget (b = 0.21, 0.09, and 0.55, respectively; all p > 0.10), although more
favorable attitudes to withholding among the members of reference groups with the same experience were
associated with a higher likelihood of withholding by the focal scientist (b = 4.95, p < 0.01). With the
exception of this one finding, these results provide support for H4a.
H4b predicted that withholding is influenced more by the attitudes than the behaviors of statussuperiors. In Models 1-4 in Table 4, we show the effects of withholding attitudes in reference groups
composed of members with higher rank, experience, productivity, or budgets than the focal scientist. The
results reveal that more favorable attitudes to withholding among scientists in all four of these reference
groups were significantly associated with a higher likelihood of withholding by the focal scientist. In
contrast, in comparable models not shown here, we examined the effects of withholding behaviors in
reference groups composed of members with higher rank, experience, productivity, or budgets than the
focal scientist and found no significant effects of the behaviors of these status-superiors (b = -0.51, 0.47,
0.51, and 0.20, respectively; all p > 0.10). Taken together, these findings provide support for H4b.
----- insert Table 4 about here ----Finally, in supplementary analyses, we tested whether the reference group withholding variables
were moderated by the individual control variables that predicted withholding in our models. The purpose
of these analyses was to see whether withholding behavior in reference groups was more strongly
associated with information withholding by scientists whose individual characteristics predisposed them
to withhold. The results revealed no significant positive interactions, however, and a significant negative
interaction between the level of withholding among scientists of the same rank and the focal scientist’s
perceptions of competition (b = -5.28, p < 0.05), indicating that withholding by those of the same rank
increased the likelihood of withholding by scientists who were less rather than more individually inclined
to withhold. We also examined interactions between the reference group withholding variables and the
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reference group control variables, for example to see whether the effects of withholding in the reference
group varied with the size of the group, but found no significant effects.

DISCUSSION
The main finding of this study is that information withholding among scientists cannot simply be
explained by the rejection of professional norms in favor of individual interests. Instead, scientists often
look to reference groups within the scientific profession to guide their behavior, indicating that they still
value professional norms, though at a meso rather than macro level. The study revealed that information
withholding by life scientists was influenced by withholding among members of their reference groups,
especially when those members were more professionally similar to the scientist in their field, specialty,
and status, and when their behaviors converged more. Scientists were influenced by professional
reference groups composed of members who were superior as well as equal in status to themselves, but
the withholding behaviors of status-equals were generally more influential than their attitudes, whereas
the withholding attitudes of status-superiors were more influential than their behaviors.
Theoretical Implications
Sociological theories of professions have long recognized that conflicting expectations create
tension at the boundaries of professions, where pressures are often imposed by encroaching occupations
or by heteronomous administrative structures that subordinate professional work to non-professional
bureaucratic goals (e.g., Scott 1965, Abbott 1988). Yet conflicting expectations exist and generate
tensions not only at the boundaries of professions but also within them, imposing contradictory demands
on members of the profession. In this study, we have argued that scientists face conflicting expectations
of information sharing versus withholding. Prior research has similarly argued that scientists experience
pressures to be both passionate and intellectually neutral about their research (Mitroff 1974), as well as to
claim originality while preserving humility (Merton 1963). However, conflicting expectations are not
limited to the academic physical or life sciences. For instance, physicians are expected to be
compassionate but emotionally detached from their patients (Merton and Barber 1963), and accountants
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should maintain good client relations yet resist pressures to report their finances in a favorable light
(Sorensen and Sorensen 1974). This pervasiveness of competing role expectations in many professions
renders efforts to resolve sociological ambivalence central to understanding professional conduct well
beyond the scientific domain.
A reference group perspective on professional conduct avoids the extremes of an over-socialized
perspective, where norms are viewed as iron-cage constraints on action (cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983)
and an under-socialized perspective, where norms are viewed as irrelevant in the face of individual
interests (cf. Granovetter 1985). Instead, norms are viewed here as locally embodied and enacted (cf.
Dacin et al. 2002, Thornton and Ocasio 2008). This view is consistent with ethnographic studies in the
sociology of science that draw attention to the everyday processes through which small groups locally
adapt global professional norms, such as organized skepticism, in the daily work of scientific laboratories
(e.g., Owen-Smith 2001). By highlighting the influence of professional reference groups on scientists’
conduct, our perspective thus offers a meso-level explanation for withholding behavior that contrasts with
the prevailing view that such behavior occurs when micro-level individual interests lead scientists to
reject a macro-level norm of communalism.
Our arguments about reference group influence suggest that cues from group members genuinely
guide scientists’ professional conduct by helping them to resolve sociological ambivalence. An alternative
argument suggested by the sociology of science, however, is that reference group cues may be little more
than mere rhetorical resources that are useful for justifying strategic behavior by self-interested
individuals (cf. Mulkay 1969, Sismondo 2004). To address this possibility, in our supplementary analyses
we examined whether reference group cues might be more readily followed by scientists who were more
individually inclined to withhold. As reported in the results section, we found no evidence for this,
indicating that our claims about reference group influence are robust to this alternative view of how
reference group cues relate to individuals’ withholding decisions.
Although this study focuses on information withholding in the scientific profession, it also offers
implications for theory and research on intra-organizational learning and knowledge transfer, responding
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to calls for further insight into the mechanisms underlying these critical organizational processes (e.g.,
Argote and Ophir 2002). Prior studies have shown that social network ties and electronic communication
technologies facilitate information exchanges (e.g., Sproull and Kiesler 1991, Reagans and McEvily
2003). The implication is that withholding occurs because barriers to sharing impede the ability to
exchange information easily, yet individuals often resist sharing even if such barriers are minimized
(Cabrera and Cabrera 2002), indicating that willingness as well as ability to share matters. Resistance to
information sharing is often explained by the relationship between the parties to the potential exchange,
including efforts to exert control over others in politicized environments (Feldman 1988), lack of trust or
status distance between the exchange partners (Levin and Cross 2004, Phillips et al. 2009), low
psychological safety in work groups (Edmondson 1999), or competition within and across firms (Larsson
et al. 1998, Hansen et al. 2005). The present study similarly emphasizes willingness rather than ability to
share (Quigley et al. 2007), but extends prior research by drawing attention to the importance of social
context beyond the immediate parties to the exchange in influencing sharing decisions. In particular,
members of a reference group can influence the sharing decisions of others who do belong to the same
group or even interact with them.
More broadly, by highlighting the role of normative expectations, this study also illuminates the
cultural issues that contribute to problems of knowledge sharing in organizations. If an organization has a
“culture of hoarding” (Boisot 1998), withholding is likely to be pervasive, no matter what structural
barriers to sharing are eliminated. Even in an organization with a strong firm-wide culture committed to
knowledge sharing and incentives in place to support it, local counter-cultures of withholding in particular
offices or work groups can be very influential for their members (Quigley et al. 2007). The findings of our
study suggest that the mechanisms that explain intra-organizational learning derive not only from
individual characteristics and structural conditions that inhibit knowledge sharing, but also from the
norms of the groups in which individuals, teams, and organizations are embedded. For practitioners
concerned with implementing “knowledge management” initiatives, the pervasive influence of such
norms can help to explain why investments in sophisticated technologies and efforts to motivate
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organization members to codify and share their expertise so often run into resistance and yield fewer
benefits than anticipated (Cabrera and Cabrera 2002).
Finally, the theoretical perspective developed in this paper suggests that dysfunctional learning
may occur as organization members look to cues from salient reference groups in the face of conflicting
role expectations. For example, corporate accounting scandals are typically attributed to the normbreaking behaviors of a handful of rogue individuals, at least officially, but an alternative explanation is
that in high-pressure corporate environments, a counter-norm of “winning at any cost” may exist in
conflict with the dominant norm of “winning fairly.” Organization members might come to view either
standard as consistent with the collective interests of the organization, and hence appropriate to their roles
as committed members. In such situations, the attitudes and behaviors of reference groups within the
organization may powerfully encourage (or discourage) organizational misconduct (Vaughan 1999).
Future Directions
Our findings support our arguments that reference group cues help to guide professional conduct.
However, scientists may also be affected by cues from other sources. For example, prior research has
shown that both spatial proximity (institutions) and social proximity (co-author networks) affect the
likelihood that an academic scientist will become an entrepreneur (Stuart and Ding 2006, Bercovitz and
Feldman 2007). We cannot separate these effects from reference group influence in this study because the
anonymity of the survey respondents prevented identification of their institutional affiliations or
interpersonal networks. Still, our sample and measures strongly suggest that the reference groups we
studied exerted influence on withholding behavior beyond spatial and social proximity effects. First, our
data set included 1,251 scientists from 100 universities, giving an average of only 12.5 respondents per
institution, who were spread across genetics, clinical, and non-clinical departments and then further
divided by specialty and status characteristics within those departments. The small size of the resulting
subgroups of comparable scientists at the same institution relative to the reference groups studied here
suggests that spatial proximity is unlikely to account for the reference group effects we identified.
Second, our findings of reference group effects were robust across multiple groups defined by a range of
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professional characteristics, indicating that salient cues are not limited to a small set of personal contacts
such as co-author networks. Additionally, our findings demonstrated the influence of reference groups to
which the scientist did not belong (status-superiors) as well as those to which they did (status-equals),
further suggesting that networks are not the only source of salient cues for scientists. Nevertheless, it is
very likely that reference groups, institutions, and networks all play roles in influencing professional
conduct, and future research could usefully distinguish their relative importance.
As noted earlier, we used an etic approach to identify reference groups based on observerdefined criteria. An alternative approach would be to ascertain a set of reference individuals by
relying on participants’ self-reports to identify those whom they know or interact with (e.g., Zabusky
and Barley 1997). Such an emic approach has its own drawbacks, however, including essentially
arbitrary limitations on the number of group members which may distort the results, as well as the
difficulty of ensuring robustness across reference groups or common professional characteristics
among the group members (Lawrence 2006). It can also be argued that our etic approach provides a
more conservative test for reference group effects because the influence of observer-defined reference
groups is likely to be weaker than the influence of participant-defined reference groups that are
clearly salient for the participants by empirical design. Still, confirming the importance of reference
group influence using an emic approach would be valuable.
Another direction for future research would be to explore the relationship between the two parties
to the potential exchange, as this may directly influence whether targets of requests decide to share their
information. We might expect scientists to be more responsive to requests from others who have helped
them in the past, for example, and status-inferiors to be more responsive to requests from status-superiors
than vice versa. Future research could also investigate exactly what, when, and how scientists choose to
share or to withhold in response to specific requests. Hilgartner and Brandt-Rauf (1994) suggested that
scientific information is embedded in evolving data streams composed of heterogeneous collections of
entities; some portions of a data stream may be well established, whereas others may be of uncertain
reliability, and some requests are minor, whereas others are of considerable magnitude. Further, some
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types of information may be inherently more difficult to transfer than others (Walsh et al. 2007). The
implication is that decisions about information sharing often become questions of what exactly to
disseminate, with whom and when, and by what means. These realities of sharing decisions in the
scientific profession parallel the challenges in many organizational settings and call for additional
investigation into the possibility that different norms and counter-norms might govern different types of
sharing in specific contexts.
Conclusion
Information sharing is critical to the advancement of the scientific knowledge on which so many
organizations and industries depend for innovation, growth, and competitive advantage in the global
economy. Despite widespread recognition of this imperative, however, information withholding is not
uncommon in the scientific profession, as in organizations. Greater understanding of the meso-level
uniformities underlying patterns of information withholding can offer insight into the causes of this
behavior among scientists, and advance our understanding of the conditions under which individuals
decide to withhold rather than share information in professional as well as organizational settings.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Variable
Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent variable
Information withheld
0.11 0.31
0
1
Individual control variables
Requests received
0.55 0.50
0
1
Commercial activities
0.33 0.47
0
1
Industry support
0.67 0.47
0
1
Human subjects
0.33 0.47
0
1
Male
0.75 0.43
0
1
Own requests denied
0.37 0.48
0
1
Perceived competition
3.59 0.57
1
4
Mentor withholding
1.60 0.62
1
4
Reference group control variables
RG size
155.55 77.68 56 279.67
RG commercialization
0.33 0.08 0.18
0.68
RG competition
3.59 0.11 3.18
3.83
RG request received
0.53 0.15 0.25
0.88
Reference group withholding variables
RG W/H level [same specialty]
0.28 0.14
0
0.43
RG W/H level [same rank]
0.25 0.20
0
2
RG W/H level [same experience]
0.30 0.18
0
0.80
RG W/H level [same productivity]
0.28 0.31
0
2
RG W/H level [same budget]
0.29 0.36
0
6
RG W/H variance [same rank]
0.80 0.46
0
1.52
RG W/H variance [same experience]
1.03 0.73
0
3.42
RG W/H variance [same productivity]
0.90 0.89
0
4.85
RG W/H variance [same budget]
0.94 0.86
0
5.66
RG W/H attitudes [higher rank]
1.54 0.16
1
2
RG W/H attitudes [higher experience]
1.55 0.20
1
3
RG W/H attitudes [higher productivity]
1.55 0.18
1
3
RG W/H attitudes [higher budget]
1.57 0.18
1
3

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Variable
Reference group withholding variables
RG W/H level [same specialty]
RG W/H level [same rank]
RG W/H level [same experience]
RG W/H level [same productivity]
RG W/H level [same budget]
RG W/H variance [same rank]
RG W/H variance [same experience]
RG W/H variance [same productivity]
RG W/H variance [same budget]
RG W/H attitudes [higher rank]
RG W/H attitudes [higher experience]
RG W/H attitudes [higher productivity]
RG W/H attitudes [higher budget]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.09
0.11
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.09
0.06
0.07

0.13
0.02
-0.15
0.03
0.13
0.07
-0.07

0.18
0.06
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.00

0.10
-0.02
0.09
0.10
0.01

0.07
0.10
0.08
0.04

0.18
0.14
0.15
0.37

0.10
0.32
0.12
0.10

0.07
0.12
0.07
0.07

-0.11
0.11
0.01
-0.26

-0.03
0.03
-0.01
0.00

0.19
0.12
0.19
0.15

0.15
0.14
0.25
0.11

0.11
0.14
0.15
0.22
0.22
0.14
0.04
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.09
0.08
0.11

-0.15
0.01
-0.10
0.00
0.03
-0.05
-0.09
-0.06
0.00
-0.10
-0.05
-0.06
-0.04

0.05
0.06
0.01
0.07
0.12
0.10
0.00
-0.04
0.07
-0.01
0.04
-0.01
0.04

0.08
0.03
0.09
0.01
0.08
0.08
0.07
-0.03
0.10
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.03

0.33
0.07
0.25
0.17
0.19
0.35
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.27
0.17
0.21
0.18

-0.02
0.03
-0.04
-0.01
0.04
0.10
0.00
-0.01
0.06
-0.09
-0.13
-0.07
-0.01

-0.03
-0.04
0.01
0.01
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.03
0.04
-0.05
-0.02

0.00
0.03
-0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
0.10
0.03
0.02
-0.01

0.11
-0.02
0.09
0.03
0.08
0.01
0.05
0.03
0.06
0.07
0.11
0.07
0.08

23

24

25

10

11

12

-0.04
-0.06 -0.01
-0.04 0.03 0.15
0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.04
-0.02
0.01 0.64
0.00 0.75 0.62
-0.09 0.72 0.42 0.55

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

-0.53
-0.06
-0.41
-0.17
-0.11
-0.27
-0.33
-0.24
-0.18
-0.37
-0.22
-0.26
-0.24

0.17
0.85
0.45
0.40
0.69
0.72
0.49
0.53
0.61
0.31
0.49
0.46

0.16
0.12
0.08
0.91
0.12
0.13
0.12
0.08
0.02
0.11
0.10

0.38
0.36
0.58
0.83
0.43
0.53
0.54
0.40
0.40
0.40

0.24
0.36
0.31
0.77
0.23
0.23
0.11
0.36
0.17

0.32
0.32
0.17
0.71
0.15
0.07
0.18
0.31

0.34
0.28
0.31
0.30
0.12
0.39
0.33

0.53
0.68
0.29
0.25
0.25
0.26

0.35
0.14
0.06
0.37
0.13

0.16
0.05 0.59
0.16 0.47 0.25
0.23 0.46 0.21 0.37

0.37
0.06
0.23
0.10
0.11
0.38
0.15
0.11
0.10
0.33
0.20
0.24
0.07

0.24
0.11
0.10
0.18
0.22
0.40
-0.05
-0.02
0.06
0.19
0.11
0.15
0.13

-0.03
0.04
-0.11
-0.01
-0.01
0.15
-0.35
-0.20
-0.25
0.24
0.11
0.09
-0.05

P < .05 where r > .06. Correlations are reported for the sample of 904 geneticists on which most of the analyses are based.
Descriptive statistics for reference group control variables shown here are calculated using averages of all reference group types.
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Table 2. Logistic analysis of the relationship between levels of information withholding in
reference groups and withholding by life scientists1 (H1 and H2)
Individual control variables
Requests received
Commercial activities
Industry support
Human subjects
Male
Own requests denied
Perceived competition
Mentor withholding

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

0.57*
(0.23)
0.44*
(0.22)
0.20
(0.25)
0.58*
(0.24)
0.85**
(0.30)
0.38+
(0.22)
0.33
(0.23)
0.30+
(0.17)

0.37
(0.29)
0.68*
(0.27)
0.19
(0.30)
0.25
(0.33)
1.02**
(0.38)
0.31
(0.26)
0.55+
(0.29)
0.06
(0.22)

0.36
(0.30)
0.58*
(0.28)
0.18
(0.30)
0.09
(0.34)
0.88*
(0.39)
0.41
(0.27)
0.56+
(0.31)
0.07
(0.22)

0.33
(0.29)
0.78**
(0.27)
0.14
(0.30)
0.21
(0.33)
1.02**
(0.38)
0.28
(0.26)
0.56+
(0.29)
0.06
(0.22)

0.45
(0.30)
0.66*
(0.28)
0.25
(0.30)
0.26
(0.33)
1.07**
(0.39)
0.27
(0.26)
0.59+
(0.31)
0.11
(0.22)

0.39
(0.30)
0.62*
(0.28)
0.29
(0.31)
0.34
(0.32)
0.97*
(0.40)
0.32
(0.26)
0.55+
(0.30)
0.06
(0.22)

-0.00
(0.00)
0.85
(3.26)
1.49
(1.99)
0.68
(1.90)

-0.00
(0.01)
-0.35
(1.44)
0.52
(1.21)
0.01
(0.97)

-0.00
(0.00)
0.13
(1.66)
1.37
(1.16)
0.63
(1.42)

-0.00
(0.01)
-0.92
(0.97)
0.20
(1.01)
-1.03
(0.93)

0.00
(0.00)
-0.19
(1.05)
-0.72
(1.15)
-0.29
(1.02)

Reference group control variables
RG size
RG commercialization
RG competition
RG requests received
Reference group withholding variables
RG W/H level [same field]

3.81
(2.69)

RG W/H level [same specialty]

3.32*
(1.49)

RG W/H level [same rank]

3.38***
(0.82)

RG W/H level [same experience]

3.26***
(0.90)

RG W/H level [same productivity]

1.78***
(0.42)

RG W/H level [same budget]
Constant
Degrees of freedom
Log likelihood
Model fit improvement2

-6.76***
(1.27)
9
-309.71
2.11

-12.45+
(7.04)
13
-213.34
5.27*

-8.12+
(4.29)
13
-204.42
21.79***

-12.07**
(4.42)
13
-208.05
14.46***

-6.27+
(3.41)
13
-204.88
19.63***

1.36**
(0.47)
-3.46
(3.72)
13
-206.23
10.70**

1

M1 includes geneticists and nongeneticists, n = 1,251; M2-M6 includes geneticists only; n = 904.
Relative to the same model excluding reference group variables. All statistics are χ2, calculated using likelihood-ratio tests.
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; standard errors in parentheses.

2

37

Table 3. Logistic analysis of the relationship between variance in information withholding in
reference groups and withholding by life scientists1 (H3)
Individual control variables
Requests received
Commercial activities
Industry support
Human subjects
Male
Own requests denied
Perceived competition
Mentor withholding
Reference group control variables
RG size
RG commercialization
RG competition
RG requests received
Reference group withholding variables
RG W/H level [same rank]

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

0.36
(0.30)
0.58*
(0.28)
0.22
(0.30)
0.02
(0.34)
0.90*
(0.39)
0.43
(0.27)
0.58+
(0.31)
0.07
(0.22)

0.28
(0.30)
0.81**
(0.28)
0.21
(0.30)
0.08
(0.34)
1.07**
(0.39)
0.28
(0.27)
0.58*
(0.29)
0.06
(0.22)

0.43
(0.30)
0.70*
(0.28)
0.29
(0.30)
0.27
(0.34)
1.05**
(0.39)
0.28
(0.27)
0.57+
(0.30)
0.11
(0.22)

0.39
(0.30)
0.59*
(0.29)
0.37
(0.31)
0.24
(0.33)
0.96*
(0.40)
0.32
(0.27)
0.52+
(0.30)
0.02
(0.23)

0.37
(0.30)
0.64*
(0.28)
0.25
(0.30)
0.06
(0.34)
0.96*
(0.39)
0.47+
(0.27)
0.55+
(0.31)
0.08
(0.22)

0.27
(0.30)
0.80**
(0.28)
0.19
(0.30)
0.05
(0.34)
1.05**
(0.38)
0.30
(0.27)
0.55+
(0.29)
0.06
(0.23)

0.39
(0.30)
0.70*
(0.29)
0.33
(0.31)
0.13
(0.34)
0.98*
(0.39)
0.30
(0.27)
0.52+
(0.31)
0.01
(0.23)

0.39
(0.31)
0.60*
(0.29)
0.36
(0.31)
0.19
(0.33)
0.95*
(0.40)
0.29
(0.27)
0.52+
(0.30)
0.00
(0.23)

0.00
(0.01)
-0.72
(1.43)
-0.29
(1.30)
-0.12
(0.96)

0.00
(0.00)
-0.39
(1.88)
-1.29
(1.34)
0.42
(1.55)

-0.00
(0.01)
-1.40
(1.07)
-0.32
(1.09)
-1.06
(0.98)

0.00
(0.00)
-0.02
(1.19)
-1.92
(1.37)
-0.15
(1.02)

0.00
(0.01)
-0.76
(1.32)
-1.48
(1.41)
-0.04
(0.97)

-0.00
(0.00)
-0.43
(1.92)
-1.38
(1.32)
0.38
(1.68)

-0.00
(0.01)
-1.76
(1.16)
-1.12
(1.21)
-0.94
(1.00)

0.00
(0.00)
-0.21
(1.21)
-2.52+
(1.43)
0.05
(1.04)

6.64**
(2.21)

RG W/H level [same experience]

11.72***
(2.96)
6.23**
(1.37)

RG W/H level [same productivity]

5.36***
(1.50)
2.16**
(0.77)

RG W/H level [same budget]
RG W/H variance [same rank]
RG W/H variance [same experience]
RG W/H variance [same productivity]
RG W/H variance [same budget]
RG W/H level*variance [same rank]
RG W/H level*variance [same experience]

3.84***
(1.03)
2.71**
(0.91)

-1.59
(0.98)

3.95**
(1.15)
-3.20**
(1.15)

-1.20**
(0.42)

-0.75
(0.50)
-0.21
(0.25)

-0.01
(0.26)
-0.59*
(0.29)

-0.72*
(0.30)
-5.28*
(2.17)
-2.44+
(1.47)

RG W/H level*variance [same productivity]
RG W/H level*variance [same budget]
Constant
Degrees of freedom
Log likelihood
Model fit improvement2

-1.73**
(0.63)
-0.51*
(0.26)
-4.97
-2.18
-4.15
0.96
0.16
-0.66
-0.04
3.38
(4.68)
(5.09)
(3.69)
(4.46)
(4.98)
(4.86)
(4.20)
(4.68)
14
14
14
14
15
15
15
15
-202.98 -203.28 -201.88 -202.46 -199.86 -201.75 -197.71 -200.92
24.67*** 24.00*** 25.63*** 18.24*** 30.89*** 27.06*** 33.96*** 21.32***

1

All models include geneticists only, n = 904.
Relative to the same model excluding reference group variables. All statistics are χ2, calculated using likelihood-ratio tests.
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4. Logistic analysis of the relationship between attitudes to information withholding
in reference groups of status-superiors and withholding by life scientists1 (H4)
M1
Individual control variables
Requests received
Commercial activities
Industry support
Human subjects
Male
Own requests denied
Perceived competition
Mentor withholding
Attitude to withholding
Reference group control variables
RG size
RG commercialization
RG competition
RG requests received
Reference group withholding variables
RG W/H attitudes [higher rank]
RG W/H attitudes [higher experience]
RG W/H attitudes [higher productivity]
RG W/H attitudes [higher budget]
Constant
Degrees of freedom
Log likelihood
Model fit improvement2

M2

M3

M4

-0.45
0.40
0.50+
(0.42) (0.29) (0.30)
1.28** 0.75** 0.88**
(0.42) (0.27) (0.27)
0.29
0.29
0.25
(0.43) (0.31) (0.31)
-0.34
0.31
0.46
(0.58) (0.33) (0.33)
1.39* 1.10** 1.02**
(0.58) (0.39) (0.39)
0.90*
0.35
0.27
(0.41) (0.27) (0.27)
0.94+ 0.51+ 0.54+
(0.54) (0.29) (0.30)
-0.37
-0.00
-0.03
(0.36) (0.23) (0.23)
0.58+ 0.55** 0.60**
(0.31) (0.19) (0.19)

0.49
(0.31)
0.79**
(0.28)
0.39
(0.32)
0.33
(0.33)
1.03*
(0.40)
0.43
(0.27)
0.55+
(0.30)
-0.04
(0.24)
0.65**
(0.19)

0.00
(0.01)
-3.26
(2.84)
-0.99
(1.73)
1.26
(1.80)

-0.00
(0.00)
-0.88
(1.02)
-0.34
(0.77)
-0.71
(0.98)

-0.00
(0.01)
-0.86
(1.17)
0.26
(0.96)
-0.51
(0.79)

-0.01
(0.00)
-1.64+
(0.88)
-0.54
(0.77)
-0.57
(0.95)

3.43+
(1.75)
2.11**
(0.75)
2.02*
(0.82)
1.82*
(0.77)
-9.53 -10.13* -6.68* -7.76**
(6.54) (4.16) (3.21) (2.97)
14
14
14
14
-95.08 -201.32 -199.16 -194.07
4.58* 8.03** 6.22*
6.01*

1

All models include geneticists only, n = 904.
Relative to the same model excluding reference group variables. All statistics are χ2, calculated using likelihood-ratio tests.
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; standard errors in parentheses.
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1

In this paper, science refers to the academic natural sciences, including the physical and life sciences.
According to Merton, sociological ambivalence differs from psychological ambivalence arising from contradictory
emotions, conflicting ideas, or confusion over how to act to fulfill one’s wishes (cf. Jansen and Von Glinow 1985,
Smelser 1998, Pratt 2000). He argued that while sociological ambivalence is a major source of psychological
ambivalence, “people are exposed to [sociological ambivalence] not because of their idiosyncratic history or
distinctive personality, but because the ambivalence is inherent in the social positions they occupy” (Merton and
Barber 1963: 96). Sociological ambivalence also differs from role conflict, which according to role theory arises from
the contradictory demands of one or more role-senders (Katz and Kahn 1966), because it arises from contradictory role
expectations that are not imposed by particular role-senders, but instead result from conflicting professional norms.
3
In additional analyses, we examined alternative dependent variables that captured whether a scientist denied
requests for information related to unpublished rather than published research, the number of denials reported, and
substantial delays in responding to requests for information related to both unpublished and published research. The
results were similar to those reported here.
4
Sensitivity tests indicated that the criteria used to construct these moving windows were robust to minor
modifications and that using categorical measures rather than moving windows also gave similar results.
Additionally, the results were similar if different specifications were used to define status-superiors, such as those at
the next rank or experience level rather than those of any higher rank or experience.
5
Consistent with prior studies of contextual effects on the behavior of scientists (e.g., Louis et al. 1989), as well as
with the extensive literature on endogenous social effects (including sociological research on peer influence in
schools and economic research on market supply and demand), we retained the focal scientist’s observation in the
higher-level group for these reference group withholding variables and also the reference group control variables.
Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data, excluding that observation would introduce a systematic bias in the
analyses. For example, if the excluded scientist had withheld, the group’s level of withholding would appear lower
than if the excluded scientist had not withheld, creating an artificial negative association between withholding in the
group and withholding by the scientist. Although retaining the focal scientist’s observation avoids inducing such
bias, it can create a “reflection problem” (Manski 1993), as it may be difficult to determine whether the average
behavior in a group causes or reflects the individual’s behavior. In the present study, however, this concern is
alleviated because including focal scientists in the averages for their reference groups is clearly less problematic
when those groups are larger; at the extreme, if a reference group includes one million scientists, the exclusion of the
focal scientist makes no difference. To ensure that the results of this study were not simply attributable to small
groups where focal scientists’ behaviors contributed substantially to the group averages, we ran our analyses using a
limited data set that omitted the smallest groups (up to 40% of all the groups in each analysis). The results of the
study still held, indicating that the effects were robust for groups to which the focal scientists’ own behaviors
contributed little.
6
Alternatively, the extent of information withholding could be measured by the proportion of the reference group
members who refused at least one request. This variable was highly correlated with the average-based variable (r =
0.85 or above) and gives the same results, so we report the results for the average-based variable only.
7
An alternative measure is the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean), but this was
not appropriate here because the mean values in the reference group categories were often close to zero, making it
too sensitive to changes in the standard deviation, and also because it confounds two characteristics of reference
group behaviors, the standard deviation and the mean, creating interpretation problems (Sorensen 2002).
8
We examined whether our results were sensitive to reference groups with very small members, such as zebra fish,
but found they were not.
9
We also examined the influence of specialty discovery rates directly by measuring the total number of academic
journal articles in that specialty between 1997 and 2000, the period addressed in the survey, as listed in the Science
Citation Index (SCI). Higher annual publication rates are assumed to reflect higher discovery rates. We found no
significant effects of this reference group control variable on withholding behavior, nor any significant interactions
with individual control variables such as the focal scientist’s rank.
10
We also tested continuous measures and found no differences in the results.
11
This likely constitutes a lower bound estimate of the actual incidence of withholding, given that survey
respondents are often reluctant to report engaging in socially undesirable behavior (Fowler 1993).
2
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